



## **Documentos de Trabajo**

### **Attitudes toward immigrants: a cross-country perspective**

**R. Todd Jewell, Natalia Melgar, David J. Molina y Máximo Rossi**

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**Attitudes toward immigrants:  
a cross-country perspective**

**R. Todd Jewell**

*University of North Texas  
Denton, Texas, USA*

**Natalia Melgar**

*University of the Republic  
Montevideo, Uruguay*

**David J. Molina**

*University of North Texas  
Denton, Texas, USA*

**Máximo Rossi**

*University of the Republic  
Montevideo, Uruguay*

## **ABSTRACT**

This paper examines the foundations of attitudes towards immigrants by focusing on individual characteristics and country-specific effects. We use a micro-level data set from 31 countries. In particular, we utilize the module on National Identity of the 2003 *International Social Survey Program* (ISSP). Results indicate that gender, education, age, labor-market status, and political and religious affiliation are important indicators of the attitude toward immigrants. The largest effect appears to be that of education, with more education being positively correlated with a positive view of immigrants. Additionally, we find that country of residence matters.

Key words: immigration, microeconomic behavior, comparative research.

JEL Classification: F22, J61, O15, A13

## **RESUMEN**

Este trabajo analiza los fundamentos de las actitudes hacia los inmigrantes. Nos centramos en las características de los individuos así como en los efectos específicos del país de residencia. Para ello, se utilizan micro-datos de 31 países, en particular, se utiliza el módulo sobre Identidad Nacional de la encuesta realizada en el año 2003 por el *International Social Survey Program* (ISSP). Los resultados indican que el género, la educación, la edad, el vínculo con el mercado laboral, la afiliación política y religiosa son indicadores importantes de las actitudes hacia los inmigrantes. El efecto más importante es el de la educación, encontrándose que incrementos en los años de educación generan actitudes más favorables hacia los inmigrantes. Adicionalmente, se encuentra que el país de residencia juega un rol relevante en la formación de estas actitudes.

Palabras clave: inmigración, comportamiento microeconómico, análisis comparativo.

Clasificación JEL: F22, J61, O15, A13

## I. Introduction

None of the components of globalization generates as much controversy as the movement of people across borders (Facchini and Mayda, 2006). This large human capital movement has been accompanied by an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments. What is not as clear, however, is if these sentiments are based on economic or non-economic issues or some combination of both (see for instance, Fetzer, 2000 or Mayda, 2006). Understanding the nature of these sentiments has great policy implications. For instance, if the sentiments are based on economic fears then policies geared towards improving the economic environment would be sufficient to stem anti-immigrant sentiments. If on the other hand, should the sentiments be based on non-economic factors then social policy would be needed for no economic policy would alleviate the issue. On the other hand, there are factors such as a crime that is both an economic and non-economic issue and that could also affect the attitudes towards immigrants. This would be the case if there is evidence and/or a belief that crime levels are related to immigrants (Nielsen and Smyth, 2008). Furthermore, the sentiments towards immigrants is also compounded by the fact that immigration policies that do not allow for free market of labor mobility has increased the number of illegal immigrants which could result in additional dimension to the anti-immigration sentiment. Consequently, recent research into anti-immigrant sentiment has provided mixed results between the economic and non-economic foundations for anti-immigration sentiment (Citrin et al., 1997, Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, Gang, et al, 2002, Mayda, 2006, Malchow-Møller et al., 2008).

Traditional migration literature has focused on the decision to migrate. The result of these studies has shown that the decision to migrate is not uni-dimensional (see for instance, Davis and Winters, 2001, Jewell and Molina, forthcoming, Massey et al. 1993, and Massey et al. 2002). Based on that finding, it would not be surprising that the more passive behavior, that is the attitude by local nationals to the immigrants, is also going to be multidimensional. Furthermore, the reactive nature of the local national to immigrants is likely to be formed by conflicting attitudes based on the broad range of impacts the immigrants may impose on their lives. Consequently, the actual behavior of the local nationals would be based on the proportional strength and direction of these attitudes. This study adds to this growing literature by examining systematically independent attitudes on

five societal aspects and their influence on the anti-immigrant sentiment. The five societal aspects we investigate are: culture, the economy, jobs, social services (spend on immigrants), crime and illegal (referring to their legal status). What sets our study apart from previous studies is that we focus on the anti-immigrant sentiment based on these five societal attitudes rather than on how an individual reacts to immigrants. In other words, two individuals who feel strongly that immigrants add to the culture of the local society may differ on the impact they have on the economy. Previous studies have compared the overall view of immigrants by these two individuals. The model developed here, will instead focus on the attitudes and hence we would have found similar pattern based on their attitude of the impact of immigrants on culture but different on their impact on the economy. Consequently, in theory, one could determine the position of each of these societal aspects by an individual and if the proportionality and direction of each was known, we could determine the overall attitude this individual would have towards immigration.<sup>1</sup> The remainder of this paper is structure in the following manner. The next section provides a review of the attitudes towards immigrants' literature. Section three presents the data and the methodology used here. The results are found in section four and the last section provides some concluding remarks.

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<sup>1</sup> Our approach here differs from the approach taken by Mayda (2006) where she focused on one of the questions for the individual and used the other questions regarding attitudes as independent variables.

## II. Anti-immigrant attitude

Fetzer (2000) argues that the anti-immigrant sentiment can be categorized into three major categories: marginality, self-interest, and contact. Marginality deals with the fact that migrants do not quickly assimilate into the surrounding society and as well as to the clash these new individuals bring to the local culture and lead to a distortion or evolutions of the local culture. The self-interest is the economic impact the immigrant has on a native individual. Contact is primarily the impact done to the neighborhood (proximity) by an immigrant to the local national. This study, as well as many others, concentrates primarily on the first two.<sup>2</sup> A more common division of the first two categories is to label them non-economic and economic factors. There is strong evidence that economic factors influence the immigrant sentiment (Mayda, 2006, Malchow-Møller et al., 2008, and Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). The impact of this influence, however, is based on some demographic characteristics of the local national. However, even here the results so far have been mixed. For instance, Mayda (2006), , and Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that lower education leads to more anti-migrant sentiment, where as Dustmann and Preston (2007). Malchow-Møller et al.(2008) suggest that a composite question based on the local nationals' understanding of the impact of the immigrants may provide a better understanding of the impact of education on immigrant sentiment

Facchini and Mayda (2006) focus on economic determinants. In particular, they analyze those linked to the social security system and the labor market. They employ the module on National Identity of the International Social Survey Program this survey was carried out in 1995. In fact, the authors restrict the dataset and they consider richest countries. The analysis is based in the Heckscher Ohlin model (HO) with two factors (skilled and unskilled workers) extended to incorporate the redistributive effects of immigration on the social security system. The authors propose two ways in which the social security system may adapt in response to immigration flows: 1) an increase in contributions and 2) a decrease in pensions. The empirical evidence is consistent with the first scenario in the presence of unskilled immigrants. In this case, authors concluded that richer people are more likely to oppose to immigration because they bear the largest share of the variation in

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<sup>2</sup> Example of contact studies are Gang et al. (2002), Li, 1998, Nielsen et al. 2006, or Nielsen and Smyth, 2008.

taxes. The authors also find that unskilled workers are more likely to be against immigration.

Mayda (2006) includes in her analysis undeveloped countries. She focuses on the level of education of natives, the degree of economic development and attitudes towards immigrants. She showed that in the case of diversified economies (the number of tradable goods produced in the economy is greater than the number of factors of production), education may be no significant in explaining attitudes towards immigrants because the immigration effect on labor supply is small. However, if the economy is not diversified immigration could change the relative price of factors and education may be relevant. On the other hand, Moreover, Richardson (2005) analyzes the determinants of attitudes towards immigration in the case of United States. Contrary to neoclassical theory, his results indicate that individuals tend to oppose to immigration if they are skilled workers and belong to union. He bases the explanation on the imperfect competition approach: those individuals do not compete with immigrants but they feel threatened by them.

Finally, Malchow-Møller et al. (2008), finds strong evidence that it is not the global economic conditions brought about by the immigrants that affect anti-migrant sentiment but that it is the self-interest of the local national that influences their sentiments. In other words, it is Fetzers (2000) interpretation of self-interest rather than a broad economic impact that lies at the center of the non-economic impact on anti-migrant sentiment.

In terms of non-economic factors, the work by Dustmann and Preston (2007) provides strong evidence that the racial component is stronger than the educational component in deterring the anti-migrant attitude. Gang et al. (2002) also show that racial and ethnic factors are a strong influence on immigrant sentiment. This approach may be based on cultural differences among natives and immigrants are particularly relevant and they predict that natives may be more hostile when cultural differences are more pronounced and more general spread throughout society (Huntington, 2004). Citrin et al. (1997) for instance, strongly argue that cultural issues are strong influence the desire to restrict migration. The above discussion clearly indicated that many competing theories of anti-migrant sentiment are currently being tested with no clear consensus; it is likely that immigrant sentiment, like traditional migration theory, will have its roots in

multidimensional factors. In the next section, we discuss the data and our methodology. As mentioned above, rather than focusing on individuals, we focused on the attitudes to get an understanding of how different attitudes about the impact of migrants differ depending on the explanatory variables.



### III. Data and methodology

The source of individual-level data analyzed in this paper is the National Identity module of the International Social Survey Program that was carried out in 2003 and covers more than 44,000 respondents from 33 countries at different stages of economic development. After excluding data for missing observations, our final data set includes 30,343 observations from 31 different countries, approximately 1,000 observations per country.<sup>3</sup>

We use responses to six statements to construct our independent variables. These statements seek to grasp different dimensions of respondent's attitudes towards immigrants. Interviewees were asked to respond to these statements on a five-point scale: (1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) disagree; and (5) strongly disagree. The responses were then scaled so that higher numbers are assigned to more positive views of immigrants. This rescaling leads to the following categorization of responses: (1) strongly negative; (2) negative; (3) neither negative nor positive; (4) positive; and (5) strongly positive.<sup>4</sup> The six statements are the following: (i) *Immigrants increase crime rates* (variable name = *crime*); (ii) *Immigrants are generally good for [country]'s economy* (variable name = *economy*); (iii) *Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country]* (variable name = *jobs*); (iv) *Immigrants improve [country]'s society by bringing in new ideas and culture* (variable name = *culture*); (5) *The government spends too much money assisting immigrants* (variable name = *social services*); and (6) *[Country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants* (variable name = *illegal*).

Table One illustrates the distribution of responses to the six statements in terms of numbers and percentages within categories. Recalling that the responses are rescaled so that “5” indicates the most positive response to the statement (i.e., a “1” response to a positive statement and a “5” response to a negative statement), it appears that attitudes toward

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<sup>3</sup> The 31 included countries are Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. Data also exist on the United Kingdom and South Africa, but these two countries are excluded due to a lack of responses to all six questions analyzed in this study.

<sup>4</sup> The choice of scaling is somewhat arbitrary, as long as statement responses are consistently scaled. This scaling is chosen so that positive coefficients in the results indicate a more positive attitude towards immigrants.

*crime*, *social services*, and *illegal* are relatively negative, while attitudes toward *culture* are more positive. Attitudes toward *economy* and *jobs* are not heavily weighted in either direction. The weighted average responses indicate a similar trend: Where an average of 3.00 indicates “neither negative nor positive,” *crime*, *social services*, and *illegal* have averages of 2.7, 2.7, and 2.0 respectively, *culture*’s average is 3.2, and the averages of *economy* and *jobs* are 3.0 and 2.9 respectively.

[INSERT TABLE ONE HERE]

The data include a wealth of information on the individual respondent. In addition to country of residence, the data include information on gender, age, marital status, income level, education, working status, political and religious affiliation, and religious attendance. The independent variables are created as a series of dummy variables. *Male* = 1 if respondent is male. *Married* = 1 if respondent is currently married or living as married, and *separated* = 1 if respondent was previously married and currently living separately, divorced, or widowed. *Urban* = 1 if respondent lives in a rural area. Citizenship information is included for both the respondent and his or her parents; *citizen* = 1 if the respondent is a citizen, while *parent a citizen* = 1 if at least one parent is a citizen. *Union* = 1 if the respondent is a union member or was a member at some point.

Income information is included as the self-assessed income decile within each country. Education information is included as a series of dummy variables measuring lowest formal classification to university graduate. Age is measured as a series of dummy variables indicating decade of life. *Work full-time* = 1 if respondent works full time, while *work part-time* = 1 if he or she works part-time. *Unemployed* = 1 if respondent is currently unemployed, *student* = 1 if respondent is a full-time student, and *work at home* = 1 if respondent is employed in home care duties. Political affiliation is defined along a spectrum of dummy variables from *far left* to *far right*. Religious attendance is measured as a series of dummy variables ranging from frequent attendance (*weekly*) to infrequent attendance (*infrequently*). Religious affiliation is a series of dummy variables indicating eight major world religions. Summary statistics are included in Table Two.

[INSERT TABLE TWO HERE]

## IV. Results

The results from ordered probit estimations of the determinants of responses to the six statements are given in Table Three (coefficients) and Table Four (marginal effects for category “strongly positive” at sample means). The coefficients signs reported in Table Three are remarkably similar across the six statements. For instance, individuals who are married or separated are less likely than single respondent to have a positive view of immigrants, and urban dwellers are more likely than rural dwellers to have a positive view of immigrants. Respondents who are not citizens have a more positive view of immigrants as do respondents whose parents were not citizens; these results are hardly surprising given that such respondents are themselves immigrants. More education is correlated with a more positive view of immigrants.

[INSERT TABLES THREE AND FOUR HERE]

Surprisingly, the work status categories are all correlated with a positive view of immigrants, suggesting that being out of the labor force leads one to have a more negative view of immigrants. As expected, the effect of political affiliation varies along a left/right spectrum, with respondents who have more leftist leanings having a more positive attitude toward immigrants. Interestingly, political centrists are shown to have a more positive view of immigrants than those respondents who have no political affiliation. Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, and respondents who identify with other eastern religions have a less favorable view of immigrants, while those respondents who identify themselves as Jewish have a more favorable view.

Other variables appear to have inconsistent effects on immigrant attitudes. Gender has an ambiguous effect, as does age and religious attendance. Furthermore, self-assessed income only appears to significantly impact views relating to immigrants and the overall economy, with higher income levels generally indicating more positive attitudes.

The marginal effects reported in Table Four are interpreted as the change in the probability of a respondent having a “strongly positive” reply to each statement calculated at the

sample means.<sup>5</sup> From these marginal effects, we learn that the variable with the largest impact on immigrant attitudes is education, specifically *university*. For example, a respondent with a university education is shown to have a 0.11 (11 percentage points) higher probability of responding in a strongly positive manner to the *jobs* statement, the largest marginal effect in Table Four. Another influential measure is *neither parent a citizen*; if a respondent does not have at least one parent who is a citizen, he or she will be 7 percentage points more likely to respond in a strongly positive manner to the *jobs* statement or to the *culture* statement. A Jewish respondent is 7.5 percentage points more likely to respond in a strongly positive manner to the *jobs* statement and 7 percentage points more likely to the *social services* statement.

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<sup>5</sup> An ordered probit estimation produces marginal effects for each category. We report only those marginal effects for the highest category for brevity. All other marginal effects are available from the authors.

## V. Conclusion

There is a growing literature attempting to understand the attitude towards immigrants. The trend towards globalization has increased the labor mobility and as a consequence there appears to be a rise in anti—immigrant sentiment. This paper has added to this growing literature by examining systematically independent attitudes on five societal aspects and their influence on the anti-immigrant sentiment. The five societal aspects we investigate are: culture, the economy, jobs, social services (spend on immigrants), crime and illegal (referring to their legal status). Our finding suggest that religion increases anti-immigrant sentiment (except for Jews), married or separated individuals have greater anti-immigrant sentiment. On the other hand, higher education leads to lower anti-immigrant sentiment most of the time.

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## Annex - tables

Table One - Statement Responses

	<i>Table</i>	<i>economy</i>	<i>jobs</i>	<i>social services</i>	<i>crime</i>	<i>illegal</i>
<i>Strongly Negative</i>	2,049	2,324	4,189	5,199	5,518	12,482
<i>Negative</i>	6,069	7,437	8,475	8,828	9,860	10,566
<i>Neither Positive nor Negative</i>	7,865	8,833	6,242	7,842	6,236	3,911
<i>Positive</i>	11,779	10,010	8,762	6,607	6,940	2,479
<i>Strongly Positive</i>	2,581	1,739	2,675	1,867	1,789	905
<i>Weighted Average</i>	3.223	3.046	2.910	2.707	2.658	1.970

Note: N = 30,343



Table Two - Summary Statistics: Independent Variables

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>
<b><i>gender: excluded = female</i></b>		
<i>male</i>	0.4864	0.4998
<b><i>marital status: excluded = single, never married</i></b>		
<i>currently married</i>	0.5921	0.4914
<i>previously married but currently separated</i>	0.1495	0.3565
<b><i>location of household: excluded = rural area</i></b>		
<i>urban</i>	0.4863	0.4998
<b><i>respondent citizenship: excluded = citizen</i></b>		
<i>not a citizen</i>	0.0500	0.2179
<b><i>parental citizenship: excluded = at least one parent a citizen</i></b>		
<i>neither parent a citizen</i>	0.1008	0.3011
<b><i>union membership: excluded = never a union member</i></b>		
<i>past or current union member</i>	0.4136	0.4925
<b><i>income decile: excluded = decile 1</i></b>		
<i>decile 2</i>	0.0364	0.1874
<i>decile 3</i>	0.0971	0.2960
<i>decile 4</i>	0.1240	0.3296
<i>decile 5</i>	0.2482	0.4320
<i>decile 6</i>	0.2315	0.4218
<i>decile 7</i>	0.1281	0.3342
<i>decile 8</i>	0.0707	0.2563
<i>decile 9</i>	0.0153	0.1228
<i>decile 10</i>	0.0165	0.1276
<b><i>education level: excluded = no formal education</i></b>		
<i>lowest classification</i>	0.1870	0.3899
<i>&gt; lowest classification</i>	0.2027	0.4020
<i>secondary</i>	0.2257	0.4180
<i>&gt; secondary</i>	0.1770	0.3817
<i>university</i>	0.1681	0.3740
<b><i>age categories: excluded = age &lt; 20</i></b>		
<i>age 20-29</i>	0.1762	0.3810
<i>age 30-39</i>	0.1974	0.3980
<i>age 40-49</i>	0.2004	0.4003
<i>age 50-59</i>	0.1730	0.3782
<i>age 60-69</i>	0.1237	0.3292
<i>age 70-79</i>	0.0771	0.2667
<i>age &gt; 80</i>	0.0185	0.1347
<b><i>labor-market status: excluded = not in labor market</i></b>		
<i>work full-time</i>	0.4806	0.4996
<i>work part-time</i>	0.0933	0.2909
<i>unemployed</i>	0.0542	0.2264
<i>student</i>	0.0597	0.2370
<i>work at home</i>	0.1003	0.3004
<b><i>political affiliation: excluded = no affiliation</i></b>		
<i>far left</i>	0.0369	0.1886

<i>left</i>	0.1836	0.3872
<i>center</i>	0.1528	0.3598
<i>right</i>	0.1943	0.3957
<i>far right</i>	0.0236	0.1517
<b><i>religious attendance: excluded = never attend</i></b>		
<i>weekly or more</i>	0.1648	0.3710
<i>between monthly and weekly</i>	0.1090	0.3117
<i>between yearly and monthly</i>	0.2846	0.4513
<i>infrequently (&lt; once per year)</i>	0.1596	0.3662
<b><i>religious affiliation: excluded = no affiliation</i></b>		
<i>Catholic</i>	0.3810	0.4857
<i>Protestant</i>	0.2254	0.4178
<i>Orthodox</i>	0.0508	0.2196
<i>Jewish</i>	0.0321	0.1763
<i>Buddhist</i>	0.0291	0.1682
<i>other eastern</i>	0.0297	0.1698
<i>other Christian</i>	0.0157	0.1244
<i>Islam</i>	0.0130	0.1132

Note: N = 30,343

Table Three - Ordered Probit Results: Coefficients  
N = 30,343

Variable	<i>culture</i>	<i>economy</i>	<i>jobs</i>	<i>social services</i>	<i>crime</i>	<i>illegal</i>
<i>male</i>	-0.0300	0.0699***	-0.0046	0.0043	-0.0950***	-0.0854***
<i>married</i>	-0.0724***	-0.0351*	-0.0120	-0.0368*	-0.0356*	-0.0801***
<i>separated</i>	-0.0856***	-0.0767***	-0.0515**	-0.0911***	-0.0537*	-0.0698**
<i>urban</i>	0.0540**	0.0472**	0.0514**	0.0659***	0.0096	0.0121
<i>not a citizen</i>	0.0670	0.1915***	0.1420**	0.1930***	0.1545***	0.0986
<i>neither parent a citizen</i>	0.4090***	0.4406***	0.4414***	0.4242***	0.3767***	0.0893*
<i>union</i>	-0.0228	-0.0286	-0.0332	-0.0676***	-0.0332	-0.0100
<i>decile 2</i>	-0.0310	0.0578	-0.0318	0.0282	0.0415	-0.0144
<i>decile 3</i>	0.0129	0.0819**	-0.0165	0.0283	0.0439	-0.0308
<i>decile 4</i>	0.0074	0.1160***	0.0349	0.0653	0.0851*	-0.0029
<i>decile 5</i>	-0.0062	0.0926**	0.0444	0.0877	0.0677	-0.0119
<i>decile 6</i>	0.0091	0.0979**	0.0540	0.1153*	0.0540	-0.0353
<i>decile 7</i>	0.0098	0.1039**	0.1007	0.1335**	0.0485	0.0224
<i>decile 8</i>	0.0588	0.1484***	0.0924	0.1240*	0.0675	-0.0442
<i>decile 9</i>	0.0436	0.2375***	0.0583	0.0862	-0.0114	0.0035
<i>decile 10</i>	-0.0013	0.1442**	0.0341	-0.0120	-0.0216	-0.0127
<i>lowest</i>	0.0424	-0.0022	-0.0301	-0.0151	-0.0069	-0.0763
<i>&gt; lowest</i>	0.1015*	0.0919**	0.0788*	0.0786**	0.0714	-0.1025
<i>secondary</i>	0.1958***	0.1996***	0.2956***	0.2605***	0.2781***	0.0170
<i>&gt; secondary</i>	0.2832***	0.2430***	0.4025***	0.3182***	0.3353***	0.0376
<i>university</i>	0.5024***	0.4678***	0.6708***	0.6573***	0.5690***	0.2370**
<i>age 20-29</i>	-0.0718*	-0.0159	-0.0122	-0.1161***	-0.0491	-0.0931**
<i>age 30-39</i>	0.0075	0.0460	0.0508	-0.0638*	-0.0345	-0.0714
<i>age 40-49</i>	-0.0289	0.0580	0.0012	-0.0633	-0.0924	-0.1421***
<i>age 50-59</i>	-0.0067	0.1262**	0.0183	-0.0660	-0.1175*	-0.1788***
<i>age 60-69</i>	0.0116	0.1539**	-0.0110	-0.0753	-0.1950***	-0.2209***
<i>age 70-79</i>	-0.0289	0.1507**	0.0099	-0.0667	-0.2283***	-0.2195***
<i>age &gt; 80</i>	-0.0179	0.1760**	0.0074	-0.0858	-0.1578*	-0.2225**
<i>work full-time</i>	0.0389	0.0376	0.1406***	0.0982***	0.0996***	0.0987***
<i>work part-time</i>	0.0889**	0.0381	0.1230***	0.1661***	0.1182***	0.1419***
<i>unemployed</i>	0.0451	-0.0328	0.0512	0.0752*	0.1067***	0.0946**
<i>student</i>	0.1685***	0.1563***	0.2437***	0.2539***	0.2849***	0.1821***
<i>work at home</i>	0.0112	0.0311	0.1128***	0.0666**	0.0588**	0.1044***
<i>far left</i>	0.2733***	0.2244***	0.2446***	0.3037**	0.2900***	0.2979***
<i>left</i>	0.1669***	0.1596***	0.1840***	0.2593***	0.1706***	0.1743***
<i>center</i>	0.1160***	0.0893**	0.1082***	0.1791***	0.0688**	0.0279
<i>right</i>	-0.0323	0.0008	0.0273	-0.0556	-0.1052***	-0.1723***
<i>far right</i>	-0.2752*	-0.1868*	-0.2293**	-0.3315*	-0.3693**	-0.3619***
<i>weekly</i>	0.0597	0.0886**	0.0008	0.0491	0.0302	0.0546
<i>monthly</i>	0.0248	0.0648*	-0.0333	0.0242	-0.0050	0.0397
<i>yearly</i>	0.0438	0.0695**	-0.0298	-0.0123	0.0024	-0.0136
<i>infrequently</i>	0.0536**	0.0692***	0.0001	-0.0447*	-0.0188	-0.0171
<i>Catholic</i>	-0.0996***	-0.0921***	-0.0866**	-0.1144***	-0.1381***	-0.1212**

<i>Protestant</i>	-0.1305***	-0.0987***	-0.1147***	-0.1044**	-0.1288***	-0.1272***
<i>Orthodox</i>	-0.0399	0.0391	0.0527	0.0546	0.0501	-0.0536
<i>Jewish</i>	0.2064***	0.1584*	0.4564***	0.4842***	0.3860**	0.0784
<i>Buddhist</i>	0.0277	-0.0842*	-0.0788***	-0.0197	-0.0851***	-0.0262
<i>other eastern</i>	-0.0055	-0.1620***	-0.0664**	0.0039	-0.1387***	-0.0708*
<i>other Christian</i>	-0.1358	-0.0868	-0.0473	0.0517	-0.0641	0.0402
<i>Islam</i>	0.3321***	0.1233	-0.0942	0.0151	-0.1192	0.0917
cut1	-1.9255***	-1.7177***	-1.0593***	-0.8423***	-1.6971***	-0.7493***
cut2	-0.9946***	-0.6710***	-0.0557	0.0982	-0.6449***	0.2686*
cut3	-0.2481**	0.1563	0.5508***	0.8552***	-0.0241	0.8336***
cut4	1.1644***	1.5668***	1.7383***	1.9042***	1.0941***	1.5509***
pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.0475	0.0561	0.0790	0.0574	0.0733	0.0550

Note: N = 30,343

\* significant at 10% level

\*\* significant at 5% level

\*\*\* significant at 1% level

Table Four - Ordered Probit Results: Marginal Effects for “Strongly Positive” Attitude

<b>Variable</b>	<i>culture</i>	<i>economy</i>	<i>jobs</i>	<i>social services</i>	<i>crime</i>	<i>illegal</i>
<i>male</i>		0.0063			-0.0080	-0.0042
<i>married</i>	-0.0097	-0.0032		-0.0035	-0.0030	-0.0040
<i>separated</i>	-0.0109	-0.0066	-0.0060	-0.0081	-0.0044	-0.0032
<i>urban</i>	0.0072	0.0043	0.0062	0.0062		
<i>not a citizen</i>		0.0200	0.0118	0.0211	0.0148	
<i>neither parent a citizen</i>	0.0687	0.0536	0.0692	0.0531	0.0415	0.0047
<i>union</i>				-0.0063		
<i>decile 2</i>						
<i>decile 3</i>		0.0078				
<i>decile 4</i>		0.0113			0.0076	
<i>decile 5</i>		0.0087				
<i>decile 6</i>		0.0092		0.0115		
<i>decile 7</i>		0.0100		0.0137		
<i>decile 8</i>		0.0149		0.0128		
<i>decile 9</i>		0.0260				
<i>decile 10</i>		0.0146				
<i>lowest</i>						
<i>&gt; lowest</i>	0.0141	0.0087	0.0098	0.0077		
<i>secondary</i>	0.0282	0.0198	0.0404	0.0278	0.0270	
<i>&gt; secondary</i>	0.0431	0.0251	0.0591	0.0358	0.0345	
<i>university</i>	0.0850	0.0552	0.1127	0.0896	0.0674	0.0136
<i>age 20-29</i>	-0.0009			-0.0103		-0.0043
<i>age 30-39</i>				-0.0058		
<i>age 40-49</i>						-0.0064
<i>age 50-59</i>		0.0122			-0.0093	-0.0077
<i>age 60-69</i>		0.0153			-0.0145	-0.0091
<i>age 70-79</i>		0.0152			-0.0163	-0.0089
<i>age &gt; 80</i>		0.0183			-0.0117	-0.0087
<i>work full-time</i>			0.0170	0.0093	0.0085	0.0048
<i>work part-time</i>	0.0125		0.0160	0.0176	0.0109	0.0078
<i>unemployed</i>				0.0075	0.0098	0.0050
<i>student</i>	0.0250	0.0159	0.0345	0.0289	0.0300	0.0105
<i>work at home</i>			0.0146	0.0066	0.0052	0.0055
<i>far left</i>	0.0436	0.0242	0.0349	0.0362	0.0310	0.0192
<i>left</i>	0.0240	0.0157	0.0242	0.0282	0.0159	0.0095
<i>center</i>	0.0164	0.0085	0.0138	0.0188	0.0061	
<i>right</i>					-0.0084	-0.0075
<i>far right</i>	-0.0300	-0.0144	-0.0233	-0.0239	-0.0230	-0.0124
<i>weekly</i>		0.0084				
<i>monthly</i>		0.0061				
<i>yearly</i>		0.0064				
<i>infrequently</i>	0.0073	0.0065		-0.0041		
<i>Catholic</i>	-0.0130	-0.0081	-0.0103	-0.0106	-0.0114	-0.0057
<i>Protestant</i>	-0.0164	-0.0085	-0.0131	-0.0094	-0.0103	-0.0058

<i>Orthodox</i>						
<i>Jewish</i>	0.0316	0.0162	0.0752	0.0662	0.0447	
<i>Buddhist</i>		-0.0071	-0.0089		-0.0067	
<i>other eastern</i>		-0.0128	-0.0076		-0.0105	-0.0032
<i>other Christian</i>						
<i>Islam</i>	0.0556					

Note: N = 30,343

For significant coefficients in table three