El seminario del Programa de Historia Económica y Social reúne quincenalmente a estudiantes de posgrado e investigadores nacionales y visitantes. El mismo cuenta con dos modalidades:
- Seminarios de Investigación: se discuten trabajos de investigación avanzados en tópicos de historia económica.
- Talleres de Discusión: se analizan los textos que alimentan los debates recientes en la disciplina a nivel global
Seminarios y Talleres (2019)
Seminario de Investigación:
Gustavo Bittencourt (Departamento de Economía – Universidad de la república) presenta Foreign Direct Investment Policy in Latin America 1980- 2015. Configurational Analysis with political, structural and macroeconomic Fuzzy Sets
I am following the analysis of policies towards foreign capital in Latin America summarized in Bittencourt (2016), covering, in this paper, 17 countries along the period 1980-2015. The current work has two directions: on the one hand to identify the applied policy instruments and analyze their configurations, and on the other hand, to explore what characteristics of the countries are associated with such configurations. In the first direction, I adapted Dunning’s and UNCTAD’s classifications, to elaborate a typology composed by three regulatory and six promotional instruments, whose definition in Latin America’s countries is made through an extensive literature review. Some determinant transitions occurred in the 1980s’: going out from the introverted industrialization in the major countries, the end of the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone and Brazil, while Central America was trying to exit from a long period of civil wars. Public strategies regarding foreign capital were reoriented from the regulatory stage between the middles 1960s-1970s decades, to the transition of 1980s, arriving to a promotional predominance in the 1990s, until the present. The increase in the presence of governments that the IDB Database of Political Institutions 2015 characterizes as left implies a few cases of confrontation via expropriation in the period 2004-2015, but the remaining left governments approach configurations of promotional predominance. The second direction of the work offers an exploratory analysis of the conditions explaining why some countries can apply certain instruments and others do not, regarding (or in spite of) their political orientation. I selected variables suggested by the bargaining theory of the relationship between governments and TNCs, and I use the configurational analysis proposed by Ragin (2008), through the fsQCA 3.0 software, to explore some relations. Among other conclusions, the truth tables shows that, in the context of this sample, every “big” country and every country combining mineral exports and low political risk, apply at least one FDI policy regulation. The absence of regulation is associated with center-right governments in smaller and political risky countries. Small countries not inserted in FDI circuits, mostly open and political un-risky, conducted Rules-Based competition for FDI. Mexico after 2004 was the only big country applying RBC. All bigger countries applied incentives competition for FDI (IBC). Relative small countries with low diversified FDI also conducted IBC. Regarding privatizations, there is a clear political determination: only center or right governments applied this instrument. After 1990, small, relative non-exporter and low educated countries, and Mexico (in the other hand, big, open and relative educated), resort to the application of free Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Big and non-exporter countries, with low risk and diversified FDI, applied sectorial policies (SEC). Small open and not risky countries, with no diversified FDI origins, also did. This exploratory results support the hypothesis provided by the bargaining governments-TNCs theory.
Fecha: 21 de marzo
Hora: 15-16:30 hs
Lugar: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, salón a confirmar